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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN AN ATTORNEY OPPOSES
A FORMER CLIENT: THE NEED FOR A REALISTIC
APPLICATION OF CANON NINE
Canon v. United States Acoustics Corp.,
398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. 11. 1975).
The Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for
Holmes' proverbial "bad man" who wants to know just how many
corners he may cut, how close to the line he may play, without
running into trouble with the law. Rather, it is drawn for the "good
man", as a beacon to assist him in navigating an ethical course
through sometimes murky waters of professional conduct.'
At no time do the waters of professional conduct become more murky
than when an attorney undertakes to represent an interest adverse to a
former client. The ethical question presented is not a new one.2 The courts
have long struggled to balance the conflicting interests which come into play:
the right of the client to be represented by the attorney of his choice; the
attorney's pecuniary interest in obtaining new clients; the former client's
interest in protecting past confidential disclosures; the interest of the profes-
sion in maintaining public respect and confidence.
The majority of decisions considering the prior representation issue
have recognized that the rule regulating such representation must weigh
carefully the interests involved. The rule of law which has developed in this
area has been enforced through the "substantial relationship test."'3 Briefly,
the rule provides that if -the former client shows that the matters of the
pending suit are substantially related to the matters wherein the attorney
previously represented him, the attorney will be disqualified.4  Although
generally accepted, the rule has not been consistently applied by the federal
courts.5 The inconsistent application may be the result of two important
1. General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974),
citing O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 170 (1920).
2. In re Boone, 83 F. 944 (N.D. Cal. 1897) (attorney disqualified for opposing
former client with whom he had consulted); Henry v. Raimon, 25 Pa. 354
(1855) (discussion of strong obligation owed former client); Bricheno v. Thorpe, 37
Eng. Rep. 864 (1821) (in camera session utilized to determine that it was unnecessary to
disqualify young attorney because of past representation of client by his former employ-
er).
3. T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y.
1953).
4. Id.
5. This article will deal primarily with the rule as adopted and developed in the
federal courts. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility has been the basis of most
of the decisions regarding this issue and thus the same principles apply in all federal
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factors: the broad provision of Canon Nine of the new Code of Professional
Responsibility directing the lawyer to avoid even the appearance of profes-
sional impropriety and increased public concern for ethical reform within the
legal profession. The struggle of the courts to incorporate Canon Nine's
axiom into precedent founded on the older Canons of Professional Ethics,
6
where no such broad dictate existed, has caused confusing, if not contradic-
tory results in many recent cases.
In Canon v. United States Acoustics Corp.7 the district court recently
confronted the issues created when an attorney represents an interest adverse
to a former client.8  Weighing case law in conjunction with Canons Four
and Nine,9 the court dismissed one of the plaintiffs, an attorney who had
formerly represented the defendant, while denying a motion to disqualify an
attorney for the plaintiff even though he had also formerly represented the
defendant.
This comment will analyze the district court's decision with special
emphasis on the relevant case law and the Code of Professional Responsibili-
ty. Particular attention will be given to those recent cases which have
sought to balance the various interests involved. The discussion will assay
the recent decisions in light of the subtle, sometimes contradictory concern of
the courts for the public image of the legal profession.
The introduction of the new Code of Professional Responsibility in
1970 apparently caused a rebirth of interest in the prior representation issue.
The substantial relationship test which had been generally accepted now
appears to be undergoing some modification. A trend appears to be
underway toward the adoption of a new rule which will better serve to
courts. Some federal court districts have adopted the code as part of their general rules.
See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT., N.D. ILL., R. 8A, 8D.
6. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs (1967). The Code of Professional
Responsibility was adopted by the House of Delegates of the ABA on August 12, 1969 to
become effective for ABA members on January 1, 1970, as amended by the House of
Delegates on February 24, 1970. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmuLrry, ii
(1971).
7. Canon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. 111. 1975),
appeal docketed, No. 75-1810, 7th Cir., Sept. 4, 1975.
8. The other major issue in this case is an ethics question dealing with dual
representation of individual directors and a corporate defendant by the same attorney in
a shareholder derivative suit. The district court disqualified the attorneys involved. The
ruling seemingly represents a proper application of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility in line with the dominant trend of recent decisions. See, e.g., Weaver v. United
Mine Workers, 492 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Murphy v. Washington Am. League
Baseball Club, Inc., 324 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Lewis v. Schafer Stores Co., 218 F.
Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (All found that multiple representation is improper when
the client's interests are adverse).
9. Canon Four provides, "A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of
a client." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBrry at 51 (1969). Canon Nine
provides, "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety." Id.
at 111.
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balance the interests of the attorney, his new client, his former client, the
public, and the profession. While this discussion will examine this trend in
depth, it will also present alternatives to the traditional rule and will posit a
new, more flexible rule which realistically reflects the balance which must
exist among the divergent interests.
Canon v. United States Acoustics Corp.
Canon v. United States Acoustics Corp.'0 was a shareholder derivative
suit" brought against United States Acoustics and its wholly-owned subsidi-
ary. Plaintiff Canon had acted as counsel for defendant United States
Acoustics in varying capacities for twelve years. One of the plaintiff's
attorneys, Giambalvo, had acted as counsel for the defendant subsidiary.
The defendants alleged that Canon and Giambalvo had represented them in
prior matters substantially related to the issues in the present litigation and
moved that plaintiff Canon be dismissed and attorney Giambalvo be disqual-
ified.
12
In summarizing the relevant precedent, the Canon court observed that
the common law had fashioned the law of disqualification to assure the
public that any disclosure made by a client would be confidential. 13  The
court cited the substantial relationship test formulated in T.C. Theatre Corp.
v. Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc.,' 4 where the court held:
[T]he former client need show no more than the matters embraced
within the pending suit wherein his former attorney appears on be-
half of his adversary are substantially related to the matter or cause
of action wherein the attorney previously represented him, the
former client. The court will assume that during the course of the
former representation confidences were disclosed to the attorney
bearing on the subject matter of the representation.' 5
After reviewing application of the T.C. Theatre rule in subsequent cases, 16
the Canon court adopted the "substantial relationship" test but with some
modification under Canons Four and Nine of the Code of Professional
Responsibility." 7
10. 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
11. The nature of the derivative suit was not discussed by the court in Canon.
12. The Canon court used the term "dismissal" when referring to one of the parties
and used "disqualify' when referring to an attorney for one of the parties.
13. 398 F. Supp. at 221. See generally Comment, Disqualification of Attorneys
for Representing Interests Adverse to Former Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 917 (1954); Annot.,
52 A.L.R.2d 1243 (1954).
14. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
15. Id. at 268.
16. The rule developed in T.C. Theatre was adopted by the Second Circuit in
Consolidated Theater Corp. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1954). Later decisions followed the rules as stated in these two cases. See
infra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
17. See supra note 9.
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The court determined that attorney Canon had represented the defend-
ant during the period in which the wrongs alleged in the derivative suit had
taken place. He had handled all contracts, had reviewed all mailings to stock-
holders, and was the sole general counsel for four of the twelve years he was
employed by defendant. On this basis the court held that there was "no ques-
tion that he might have acquired information which is substantially related to
the pending suit."'1 8 Finding that the rule of T.C. Theatre applied to counsel
turned litigant, 19 the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss Canon
as a plaintiff.
Attorney Giambalvo had represented the corporation in one or two
matters for a total of two or three months. He had prepared a pre-
organization subscription for United States Acoustics to establish its subsidi-
ary as a Swiss corporation. The subsidiary had not been incorporated at
that time; however, it was later incorporated in Panama. The defendants
alleged no other specific incidents where Giambalvo had acted as their
attorney. The court denied the motion to disqualify Giambalvo, holding
that the defendants had not met the burden of showing that the former
representation rendered by Giambalvo was substantially related to matters
embraced in the pending suit.
To determine if Canon represents a proper application of both preced-
ing case law and the relevant Canons of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, it is necessary first to explore the adoption and development of the
substantial relationship test. Secondly, and more importantly, it is necessary
to examine the balance of interests involved in relation to the new Code of
Professional Responsibility0 and current public attitudes toward the legal
profession. This review is designed to indicate a shift in emphasis in the
balancing process that may prompt the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to
adopt a modified rule respecting the attorney's relationship with former
clients.
EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE
Subsequent to T.C. Theatre, two cases were decided which sought to
explain the substantial relationship test, Consolidated Theaters, Inc. v.
Warner Brothers Circuit Management Corp.2 1 and United States v. Standard
Oil Co.2 2 The substantial relationship test generally adopted by later cases
is a synthesis of the holdings in these cases. While T.C. Theatre stated the
rule, Consolidated and Standard Oil explained and clarified it.
18. 398 F. Supp. at 228.
19. As authority the court cited Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382
(3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
20. The code was adopted and became effective January 1, 1970.
21. 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
22. 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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In Consolidated, an anti-trust case, the defendants moved to have one
of the plaintiff's attorneys disqualified. The attorney had served as a clerk
and associate in a large firm which had represented an alleged co-conspirator
of the defendant. In restating the T.C. Theatre test the court held that "the
former client need show no more than that the matters of the pending suit
are substantially related to the matters wherein the attorney previously
represented him".23 Consolidated raised a question concerning the extent to
which a court could investigate the prior representation in order to determine
if it was substantially related to the current litigation. In clarifying the
applicable evidentiary test, Consolidated ruled that the former client need
only establish "by reasonable inference" that confidences might have been
reposed in the attorney during the prior representation. 24 Once an attorney-
client relationship regarding a certain matter was established, it would be
irrebuttably presumed that confidences were disclosed regarding that matter.
If a substantial relationship was shown to exist between the prior representa-
tion and the current matter, the attorney would be disqualified whether or
not any confidences had been actually reposed. The court recognized,
however, that the attorney could rebut the substantial relationship alleged by
the former client.
United States v. Standard Oil expanded Consolidated, holding that the
complainant need only show access to "substantially related" material and
the inference that confidences were communicated would follow. The court
reasoned that confidences must be protected if the public was to have rever-
ence for the law and confidence in its guardians. The Standard Oil court
stated that if a client could be required to reveal confidences at a hearing
then "the very purpose of the rule of secrecy would be destroyed, and the free
flow of information from client to attorney, so vital to our system of justice,
would be irreparably damaged."2 5
While the attorney would be permitted to rebut the existence of a
substantial relationship between the prior matter and the current one,
Consolidated and Standard Oil made it clear that no rebuttal proof could be
offered by the attorney which would disclose any confidences between the
attorney and the former client. The court would only examine the nature of
the representation and infer that confidences were disclosed regarding the
subject matter. But the important element under the T.C. Theatre test re-
mained-the former client had to prove a substantial relationship between
the prior representation and the instant matter.
The decisions confronting this issue subsequent to Standard Oil ap-
plied the substantial relationship test to resolve the question of disquali-
23. 216 F.2d at 924.
24. Id.
25. 136 F. Supp. at 355.
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fication. 26 Although few new elements have entered into a consideration
of the problem until recently, it was recognized that, in order to obtain
an ethical result, a consideration of a prior representation issue must balance
the interests involved.2 7 Prior to the adoption of the new Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, the balancing done under the substantial relationship
test ostensibly favored the attorney's interest in obtaining clients and the new
client's interest in freely choosing counsel. This balance has undergone
significant change in recent cases because of two important factors. One is
the adoption of the new Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
Canon Nine's directive to "avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety. ' 28  The second significant factor is the changed public attitude
towards the legal profession. More than ever before, the public has
demonstrated a growing concern for ability of lawyers to regulate their own
ethics. 29 As a result of incidents like Watergate, public esteem for the legal
profession has dipped to an all-time low. 30  These new factors have caused
the courts in recent decisions involving the prior representation issue to shift
the traditional balance towards a greater emphasis on the public interests
involved. While the recent decisions have not been consistent, they do
indicate that a change in the traditional rule may be necessary in order to
better balance these new interests with those emphasized under the tradi-
tional substantial relationship test.
THE SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP TEST AND THE EMERGENCE
OF CANON NINE
Recent decisions exhibit a new regard for the propriety of an attorney
representing an interest adverse to a former client. These cases, while
echoing the rule established under T.C. Theatre and its progeny, also
confront the emergence of a new Code of Professional Responsibility.
3'
Significantly, the new code contains an axiom not found in any of the forty-
26. See, e.g., Fisher Studio, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 232 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1956) (anti-
trust action in which plaintiff's attorney, who had formerly represented nine of the
defendants in previous anti-trust actions, was disqualified as to the nine defendants);
Shelley v. The Macabees, 184 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (suit for recovery of
purchase price in which defendant, a fraternal beneficial insurance society, sought to
have the attorneys for the plaintiff disqualified because the firm had formerly represent-
ed the plaintiff in a number of matters. Motion to disqualify denied); Fleischer v.
A.A.P. Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (attorneys, who had previously repre-
sented plaintiffs in general matters for a number of years, now represented defendant in
a suit for dissolution. Motion for disqualification denied).
27. 163 F. Supp. at 552.
28. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY No. 9.
29. See, e.g., BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WrI LAWYERS at 157-91 (1968); Commen-
tary, A Crisis of Double Standards at the Bar, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 27, 1973, at 33.
30. See, e.g., Awful Lot of Lawyers Involved: Watergate Case, 102 TIME, July 9,
1973, at 50.
31. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (197.1).
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seven canons of the old Canons of Professional Ethics.32  Canon Nine
directs that "a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety. '33  After the adoption of the new code, the courts began to
consider whether an attorney who represented a client in a matter adverse to
a former client was acting within the mandate of Canon Nine-avoiding
even the appearance of impropriety.
One of the first decisions to contemplate this question was Richardson
v. Hamilton International Corp.,34 which presented a fact situation similar to
Canon. The plaintiff, an attorney formerly employed by the defendant
corporation, brought an action against the corporation. The Third Circuit
determined that the T.C. Theatre test was applicable whether the attorney
acted as plaintiff's counsel or was the plaintiff himself. While purportedly
applying the substantial relationship test, the Richardson court found only
that there was "some relationship" between the former representation and
the current litigation. 35 Judge Vanartsdalen held that "it is a close question
but to avoid the 'appearance of evil' disqualification must be directed." 30
The court was faced with the dilemma of contradictory rules-How to apply
a substantial relationship test and still avoid the "appearance of evil."' 37
The court labeled its holding an application of the established substantial
relationship test, but actually employed a test less burdensome on the former
client in order to obtain an ethical result.
Green v. Singer Co.38 pointed up the need for a change in emphasis
among the interests involved in the prior representation issue. The Third
Circuit split four to three, the majority weighing the interests of the attorney
in denying disqualification and the dissenters emphasizing the appearance of
impropriety and favoring disqualification. Greene involved an action for
unfair competition and patent infringement. The plaintiff's patent attorney
had been formerly employed by a subsidiary of the defendant corporation
and had handled some patent applications which were involved in the instant
action. The Greene majority held that the trial judge had not exceeded his
discretion in limiting the attorney's role as counsel for plaintiff yet allowing
32. This fact was recently acknowledged by the Second Circuit in General Motors
Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649, n.19 (2d Cir. 1974). Although certain
of the ethical considerations under Canon Nine are embodied in the old code, the general
axiom directing the avoidance of even the appearance of impropriety is not. Compare
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, Ethical Consideration 9-3, with ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs No. 36.
33. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY No. 9.
34. 333 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
35. Id. at 1054 (emphasis added).
36. Id.
37. Because the trial took place before the adoption of the new code, the decision
was founded on old Canons Six and Thirty-seven. The appellate court decided the case
after the new code went into effect. The language and stress on "appearances" indicated
that the court recognized the mandate of new Canon Nine.
38. 461 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972).
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him to act as co-counsel. The dissenters disagreed, recognizing that the
court's duty in protecting attorney-client confidences must take into consider-
ation appearances of impropriety. The three dissenting judges were troubled
by the large number of charges being made concerning moral and ethical
considerations affecting the bar. Their opinion cited the ABA Standing
Committee on Professional Ethics which stated, "[T]he lawyer should avoid
representation of a party in a suit against a former client, where there may
be the appearance of a conflict of interest or a possible violation of
confidence, even though this may not in fact be true."3 9  The dissenting
judges recognized that Canon Nine directed a test which would weigh the
appearance of impropriety heavily.
While the decisions in Richardson and Green indicate a growing
emphasis on the application of Canon Nine in order to preserve public
respect for the legal profession, they also indicate the problems involved in
reconciling Canon Nine with the traditional substantial relationship test. A
series of recent cases decided by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals have
also sought to balance the interests involved. These cases further demon-
strate the difficulties encountered in attempting to strike such a balance.
The Second Circuit gave extensive consideration to the prior representa-
tion issue in Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc.40 The court recognized
the issue as "a question of acute sensitivity and importance, touching the
vital concerns of the legal profession and the public's interest in the
scrupulous administration of justice."'4 1 In considering whether to uphold
the disqualification ordered below, the Emle court articulated the balancing
hinted at in Greene.42 The decision underscored the importance of preserv-
ing "the balance between an individual's right to his own freely chosen
counsel and the need to maintain the highest ethical standards of professional
responsibility. '43  Although the case for disqualification was clear, 44 the
court acknowledged that because of the importance of preserving public
respect for the law and lawyers, disqualification may be necessary where
there was only the appearance of a possible violation of confidence, even
though it may not be true in fact.
45
Emle is significant because it was the first case which sought to justify
the application of the T.C. Theatre rule, determined under the old Canons of
Professional Ethics, to a situation covered by the new Code of Professional
39. Id. at 243.
40. 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973).
41. ld. at 564.
42. 461 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1972).
43. 478 F.2d at 565.
44. The attorney in question had first represented Burlington Industries, Inc. as a
client and then proceeded to represent a client suing a Burlington subsidiary. The
matter involved in each controversy was identical.
45. 478 F.2d at 571.
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Responsibility. While reconciling the application of Canon 'Four with the
substantial relationship test, the court did not recognize that Canon Nine is a
new provision, not embodied in the old code. 46  Notwithstanding this
oversight, the Emle court's strong discussion stressing the importance of
avoiding the appearance of impropriety shifted the balance of the interests
involved toward the importance of maintaining public respect and confidence
and away from the traditional emphasis on the interests of the attorney in
obtaining new clients and the interest of the new client in securing the
attorney of his choice.
47
One year after Emle, in General Motors Corp. v. City of New York,
48
the same court recognized that the "appearance of impropriety" considera-
tion was not embodied in the old code, stating that "it was not until the
adoption of Canon Nine of the Code of Professional Responsibility that the
canons of ethics expressly enunciated that doctrine." 4 9 In General Motors a
former Justice Department attorney represented the City of New York in an
anti-trust action against General Motors. The court found that the attorney
had had "substantial responsibility" in formulating a previous anti-trust
complaint against General Motors which was "sufficiently similar" to the
present action.50  In upholding the disqualification of the attorney the
General Motors court noted, "[W]e must act with scrupulous care to avoid
any appearance of impropriety lest it taint both public and private segments
of the legal profession." ' 51  Thus the balance in this case was markedly
shifted towards maintaining public respect and confidence, while the interests
of the attorney and the new client appear to have been given less weight
than in earlier cases.
In Hull v. Celanese Corp.5 2 the Second Circuit confronted a situation
where an attorney who had switched sides in the course of the same litigation
sought to prove that he had never had access to any confidences. The court
rejected his defense because it overlooked "the spirit of Canon Nine as
interpreted by this court in Emle."'5 3 Although the case for disqualification
was clear, the Hull court reiterated that any doubts should be resolved in
favor of disqualification.
54
46. See note 32 supra.
47. The strength of the argument that at all times the attorney has the right to the
attorney of his choice would appear to be diminished by the official court rules of some
courts. Rule 6.1(a), RULES OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS (1975),
provides that a continuance in a trial will be granted only where the attorney is engaged
in another trial. By implication, the court forces the litigant to obtain an attorney other
than the one of his original choice.
48. 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
49. Id. at 649.
50. Id. at 650-51.
51. Id. at 650 (emphasis by the court).
52. 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975).
53. Id. at 571-72.
54. Id. at 571.
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It would appear from Emle, General Motors, and Hull that the Second
Circuit was clearly moving towards modifying the traditional substantial
relationship test in order to align the rule with Canon Nine and to regain lost
public respect. Most recently, Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp.55 appears to have reversed the course taken by these three
previous cases. An attorney had formerly been employed by a large firm
which represented Chrysler Motors. While with the firm, he had done legal
research and had written briefs on a number of auto-dealer disputes. He
could prove that he had never actually come in contact with the client and
that he had actually received no confidences. In the pending suit the
attorney represented an auto dealer in a contract dispute with Chrysler
which involved many of the same issues that were involved in the earlier
suits. Chrysler moved to have him disqualified because of this past relation-
ship.
In denying the motion the trial judge sought to balance the interests
involved. In an apparent rejection of the recent trend toward a greater
emphasis on the avoidance of impropriety, the trial court stressed the
importance of avoiding "an excess of ethical fervor that unnecessarily
restricts freedom of attorneys, clients and our system of free enterprise. '5 6 In
reviewing the decision the Second Circuit reiterated the importance of
preserving the balance between an individual's right to his own freely chosen
counsel and the need to maintain the highest ethical standards. The Silver
court, apparently weighing the former consideration heavily, reviewed the
cases which had resulted in disqualification and decided that in most, the
substantial relationship had been "patently clear."'5 7  The court did not
elucidate further but, by implication, held that disqualification would be
granted only where a patently clear substantial relationship was proved.
Although the court was faced with a case where there was at least some
appearance of impropriety, the court apparently ignored the course it had
laid in Emle, General Motors, and Hull. Although Canon Nine was given
some reference, the emphasis on an "appearance of impropriety" and public
confidence generally was greatly diminished and contradicted by this deci-
sion.
While the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not specifically dealt
with the prior representation issue, a Wisconsin district court has recently
considered the problem in Marketti v. Fitzsimmons.58 A firm which had
previously represented a union "local" was representing the "international"
in a suit against individual members of the union local. In disqualifying the
55. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
56. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 591
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
57. 518 F.2d at 754.
58. 373 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
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firm the court placed special emphasis on Canon Nine and the importance of
retaining public respect. Although the court assertedly applied the substan-
tial relationship test, no clear relationship is indicated by the facts. The
court did not expressly balance the interests involved, but its decision clearly
emphasized concern for public trust and confidence.
The cases which have decided the prior representation issue since 1970,
with the possible exception of Silver, have increasingly emphasized the
application of Canon Nine. Although Canon Nine has not been the sole
criterion, the decisions have recognized that the courts must guard against
the appearance of impropriety and protect the confidences of a former client.
The decisions have given different weight to the various interests involved
and have therefore reached different conclusions as to what a "substantial
relationship" is. In the Second Circuit alone the court strongly weighed
public considerations in light of Canon Nine in upholding disqualification in
Emle, General Motors, and Hull, but in Silver diametrically shifted the
balance to an emphasis on the importance of the attorney's right to obtain
new clients and the client's right to freely chosen counsel in order to deny
disqualification. The recent cases do not define a substantial relationship.
While the language of the cases indicates that this traditional test may not
avoid the appearance of impropriety criterion, it is not clear exactly what the
test should be.
'Canon v. United States Acoustics Corp. 9 is the most recent case to
consider the issue. The court recognized the importance of the issue and
weighed the public interests involved heavily by applying Canon Nine. But
a significant question arises from 'Canon and the other recent decisions
stressing the appearance of propriety: When a former client fails to bear the
burden of proving a "substantial relationship" between the prior representa-
tion and the instant litigation, but does establish some, or a reasonable
relationship, is the appearance of impropriety avoided where the attorney is
not disqualified? An answer may lie in an analysis of the language of recent
case law, a realistic application of Canon Nine, and a recognition of the
public's changed attitude toward lawyers.
The Ethical Dilemma
Recent decisions which have confronted the prior representation issue
have been faced with a significant dilemma. While precedents established
the substantial relationship test as the apparently applicable rule, the courts
have strained to reconcile a rule which favors the interests of the new client
and the attorney with the recently adopted Canon Nine and the current
public attitude toward the legal profession. Although recent decisions have
59. 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. IlI. 1975).
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shifted the emphasis of the interests involved, the shift has caused an
inconsistent application of the substantial relationship test.
The substantial relationship test adopted in T.C. Theatre6 ° was applied
to a fact situation in which it was fairly obvious that the attorney should
have been disqualified. 61 In a case such as T.C. Theatre or, more recently,
Hull v. Celanese Corp.,62 where the attorney has done little more than
switch sides in virtually the same litigation, the substantial relationship test is
adequate and the result avoids the appearance of impropriety. But in a case
such as Richardson v. Hamilton International Corp.,63 where the court could
determine only "some relationship," or Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp.,6 4 where the attorney had done three and a half
years of legal work for the former client, the application of the substantial
relationship test fails to avoid the appearance of impropriety.
The majority of decisions considering the prior representation issue
since the adoption of the new Code of Professional Responsibility have
recognized that Canon Nine should be applied. Only one of the decisions,
however, has expressly recognized that no similar canon existed under the
old Canons of Professional Ethics.65 The majority of courts have over-
looked the fact that the substantial relationship test as originally developed
did not incorporate the appearance of impropriety as a significant or
determinative factor. A recognition of this fact and a more aggressive
application of Canon Nine should result in a modified rule requiring less
emphasis on the interests of the attorney and the new client and more
emphasis on the broader interests of the public, as well as the specific
interest of the former client.
Richardson,66  the dissent in Greene,6 7 Emle,68 Hull,69  General
Motors,70 and, most recently, Canon indicate a trend toward a new rule.
Although the Silver decision 7' did not acknowledge this trend, its confusing
and contradictory result points up the need for a new rule that would give
more weight to the "appearance of impropriety" and place less emphasis on
the client's right to the attorney of his choice and the effect of a disqualifica-
60. See note 15 supra accompanying text.
61. This is clearly indicated by the facts as stated by the court: "[P]resent counsel
for the plaintiff would necessarily be called upon to prove against . . . his former client
the very charges against which he had earlier defended it." T.C. Theatre Corp. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
62. 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975).
63. 333 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
64. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
65. 501 F.2d 639, 649 n.19 (2d Cir. 1974).
66. 333 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
67. 461 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1972).
68. 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973).
69. 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975).
70. 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
71. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
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tion on an attorney's ability to obtain new clients.7 2 While none of the cases
have expressly adopted a new rule, it is manifest that a modified rule that
reaches a more ethical balance among all the interests should be adopted.
Crisis in Confidence-The Need for a New Rule
A modified rule is not only indicated by the recent trend, but is also
needed because public confidence in the ability of the legal profession to
regulate itself is eroding. 73  The public looks upon the profession as a "self-
defined, self-regulating monopoly" which brooks no lay interference and
avoids disciplining even the most venal and inept lawyers. 74  Indeed, their
is doubt within the profession whether lawyers can successfully regulate their
own conduct.
7 5
In view of the phenomenon of "Watergate" and the distrust, lack of
confidence-even disdain-it has evoked amont elements of the public in
their view of the legal profession, 76 the courts could look to Canon Nine as a
starting point in seeking a rule which properly balances the interests involved
in the prior representation problem. The canons are general axioms which
must be applied to partcular factual instances to ensure effectuation of their
expressed goal of aiding the lawyer in attaining the "respect and confidence
of the members of his profession and of -the society which he serves." 7 7 If
applicable canons such as Canon Nine are merely discussed by the courts
without becoming the grounds of decision, public confidence in the legal
profession, its institutions, and inevitably law itself will continue to diminish.
As the Errde court opined, "[E]thical problems cannot be resolved in a
vacuum."
78
A commentary written in the wake of Watergate may reflect the
importance of a realistic application of Canon Nine. Stating that "lawyers
are supposed to be above suspicion," the author continued, "[But] thanks in
no small part to the sorry failure of the bar to put teeth into its own
enforcement machinery, its 'ethics' have permitted this nation to come to the
brink of constitutional disaster . . . -79 The article concluded, "[L]aw-
72. For an argument in favor of the rights of the attorney and the new client, see
Comment, Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing Interests Adverse to Former
Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 917, 927-28 (1954).
73. America's Lawyers: A Sick Profession?, 76 U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORTS,
March, 1974, at 23; Waltz, Some Thoughts on the Legal Professions Public Image, 23
DEPAUL L. REV. 651 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Waltz].
74. Waltz, note 73 supra, at 653.
75. See Brink, Who Will Regulate the Bar, 61 A.B.A.J. 936 (1975).
76. See generally Awful Lot of Lawyers Involved: Watergate Case, 102 TIME, July
9, 1973, at 50; Lawyers and Ethics, 103 INTELLECT, October, 1974, at 16; Complaints
About Lawyers: Are They Justified?, 79 U.S. NEws, July 21, 1975, at 46.
77. The Preamble and Preliminary Statement to the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility contains a statement of the intended goals of the code.
78. 478 F.2d at 565.
79. Commentary, A Crisis of Double Standards at the Bar, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct.
27, 1973, at 33.
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yers cannot expect the public to believe they will seriously enforce their own
code of ethics against members of their own fraternity. 80  Such views may
not be unrealistic in light of the district court opinion in Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,8 where the judge castigated the
movant to avoid "an excess of ethical fervor" and in a substantial segment of
the opinion maintained that courts should not make it difficult for young
attorneys who specialize to obtain clients. 82  Clearly there is reason for a
modified rule. But merely stating that the application of Canon Nine will
solve the problem is not enough. It is necessary to examine the alternatives
and develop a rule which balances the interests in a manner designed to reach
ethical, results.
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP TEST
Given the inconsistent application of the substantial relationship test in
recent cases, the courts cannot continue to utilize this traditional rule. An
ethical solution which equitably balances the interests involved is necessary.
Because of the wide discretion permitted the trial judge in controlling the
attorneys before his court,8 3 a test must be provided which the judge can
apply to reach a solution which does not unfairly restrict the attorney or his
new client, but which at the same time falls within the mandate of Canon
Nine. The following is a three-part test which seeks to balance these diverse
interests.
First, where a prior attorney-client relationship has been proven regard-
ing a certain matter or matters, the trial judge should determine whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the issue or issues involved in the prior
representation will be placed in issue in the current litigation. If such a
likelihood is determined, then to protect prior confidential disclosures involv-
ing those issues, the attorney should be disqualified. No breach of confi-
dence need be proved, for it is presumed in order to preserve the spirit of
Canon Nine.8 4  Such a test, while relieving some of the burden that the
former client assumed under the substantial relationship test, protects the
attorney from disqualification at the former client's whim. Thus an attorney
who had formerly drawn up a will for a client could not later be disqualified
for opposing that client in a personal injury suit. This rule takes into
80. Id.
81. 370 F. Supp. 581.
82. See the section of the opinion entitled "Dangers of Unnecessary Restrictions on
Young attorneys," 370 F. Supp. at 589-91 for the complete text of this argument.
83. See, e.g., Greene v. Singer Co., 461 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1972).
84. A similar test was recently adopted in Alpha Investment Co. v. City of
Tacoma, 13 Wash. App. 532, 536 P.2d 674 (1975), where the court used the test to
uphold the disqualification of an attorney. The atorney had formerly been a deputy
prosecutor for the county, during which time he had access to civil suit files. Therefore,
he was prevented from representing a private company in an action against the city and
county.
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consideration the interest of the attorney who wishes to obtain new clients as
well as the interest of the client who wishes to freely choose his counsel. It
also reflects the mandate of Canon Nine and thus seeks to preserve public
respect and confidence in the legal profession.
While the first part of this test will be applicable in the majority of
situations, there is one area where the attorney should almost always be
disqualified. Where an attorney has been the general counsel for a corpora-
tion for a substantial length of time and then seeks to represent a party
opposing that corporation, the attorney should then be disqualified. Inner
knowledge of the corporation and its officers must give rise to a pre-
sumption of confidential disclosures regarding diverse matters such that
the appearance of impropriety could not be avoided unless the attorney was
disqualified. The Canon court took this approach in disqualifying attorney
Canon, holding that "even if defendants had been unable to persuade the
court that there was a substantial relationship, Canon's representation was so
lengthy and pervasive that he would have to be disqualified under Canon
Nine."' 5 Thus Judge Marshall recognized both the inadequacy of the
substantial relation test and the importance of Canon Nine.
Finally, a flexible test must provide the former client with the option of
holding an in camera session in order to demonstrate that confidences were
reposed in the attorney which may be used against him in the present
litigation. It is recognized that the in camera session may bring out those
confidences which the former client is seeking to protect.8 6 Nevertheless,
the in camera session has been utilized in at least one recent case dealing
with a. prior. representation issue.87  While the client may be obligated to
disclosepast confidences to the trial judge, he will thus avoid having them
used against him. -The in camera session should be employed only in
unusual situations where the issues in the prior representation indicate that
there is no reasonable likelihood that confidences would be disclosed during
the current. litigation and then only at the option of the former client.
'It should be noted that while disqualification has been the generally
accepted remedy, an entirely different remedy will apply where the attorney
opposes the former client with intent to harm by using previously disclosed
confidences. Courts have found disbarment 8 or suspension from practice 9
S'85. *398 F. Supp. at 228-29.
.86. Consolidated Theaters, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216
F.2d at 926 (2d Cir. 1954) (dicta)
87. United States v. Wilson, 497 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1974) (a criminal case where
the in camera session included the examination of Secret Service records).
S.. 88. Thatcher v. United States, 212 F. 801 (6th Cir. 1914), appeal dismissed, 241
U.S. 644 (1914)- (a criminal case in which an attorney was guilty of intentionally
misleading a client in the making of a promissory note, and then representing the payee
in an action against the maker).
89. United States v. Kegley, S F, Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1934) (attorney, appointe d
to investigate the theft of public bonds, accepted employment from the party accused of
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to be applicable remedies in such circumstances. A consideration of the
prior representation issue should make inquiry as to the intent of the
attorney involved.
CONCLUSION
In reviewing Canon, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has a forum
in which to recognize the contradictory trend established in recent case law.
While there is no question that attorney Canon was properly dismissed, there
may be an issue as to whether attorney Giambalvo should not have been
disqualified. Under the suggested test, if there is a reasonable likelihood
that the issue involved in the prior representation will be placed in issue in
the current litigation, then he should have been disqualified.
The "substantial relationship test" adopted in T.C. Theatre should be
recognized as having been adopted under the old Canons of Professional
Ethics, which contained no axiom concerning the appearance of impropriety.
It is also necessary for the courts to pay heed to the climate of public
confidence and recognize the dramatic change since T.C. Theatre. These
interests must be weighed realistically in balancing them against the tradi-
tionally weighted interests of the attorney and his new client.
In view of the trend in recent decisions exhibiting a greater emphasis on
the appearance of impropriety, the fact that the general principle embodied
in Canon Nine is not found in the old code under which the substantial
relationship test was developed, and the public lack of confidence in the
legal profession, it would appear that the time is right for the adoption of a
new or modified rule. Avoiding even the appearance of impropriety is a
moral obligation faced by the legal profession and the courts. It is a moral
obligation assumed because of the sensitive and integral role a lawyer plays
when a client confides in him. The general public may never know of a
particular situation where an attorney represented an interest adverse to a
former client. But because of his unique position in society, the lawyer must
operate as if the public eye is upon him at all times. Too many attorneys
have recently attempted the illegal and improper believing the public would
never know.
Canon Nine would seem to be a public-oriented mandate. Its apparent
purpose is to preserve public respect and confidence in the legal profession.
Every decision construing it has come to this conclusion. This public respect
can be instilled through particular examples of ethical conduct. The prior
representation situation is an instance where the courts may demonstrate the
ability of the legal profession to police itself. By truly seeking to avoid the
complicity in the theft of the bonds. Suspension from practice for three years.).
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appearance of impropriety in such instances the courts may begin to reinstill
public confidence in the legal profession. The past application of the sub-
stantial relation test in these circumstances has often given the appearance
that the court is practicing legal fraternalism. A new or modified rule along
the lines of the one suggested may prevent this appearance. It is recognized
that such a rule may be considered as "an excess of ethical fervor"90 by some
members of the bar, but it is seriously doubted that such an application would
appear excessive to members of the public.
ROBERT T. GRUENEBERG, JR.
90. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 591
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
